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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
Historically, the flag State has enjoyed the exclusive right
to prescribe and enforce safety of life at sea and pollution
prevention standards aboard its vessels on the high seas. 1

In

recent years, however, the exclusive and all-encompassing
jurisdiction of the flag State has come under review.

A

large number of vessel casualties and pollution incidents
have revealed that some flag States, particularly flag of
convenience or open registry States, fail to implement or
enforce international safety of life at sea or pollution
prevention standards for a variety of reasons.

Some States

lack the resources, finances, or infrastructure to operate an
effective maritime administration, while other States lack
the will to implement or enforce international standards.
Beginning in the 1970s, the International Maritime
Organization (IMO) undertook a number of initiatives to
improve flag State compliance with international maritime
safety and pollution control standards.

Among the

initiatives the IMO implemented was the concept of port State
control.

Under this concept, the port State2 may inspect,

detain, and, in certain cases, penalize foreign-flag vessels

1 The flag State is the State of a vessel's registry. When a vessel is navigating within the
jurisdiction of another State, that State has concurrent jurisdiction over the vessel. R. Legatski,
"Port State Jurisdiction Over Vessel-Source Marine Pollution." 2 Harvard Environmental Law
Review (1977), p. 25.
2 The port State is a state that claims jurisdiction over a vessel in its ports, internal waters or
offshore terminals .
'

1

operating within its ports, internal waters,3 and offshore
terminals for violations of international standards relating
to (1) vessel design, construction, equipment, and manning
standards, (2) alleged discharge of pollutants, and (3) on
board working conditions. 4

The concept is embodied in the

following IMO conventions:
(1)

Regulation 19 of Chapter 1 of the 1974 safety
of Life at Sea convention, as amended in 1978
(SOLAS 74 /78 ) ; 5

(2)

Article 21 of the 1966 Load Line Convention
(LLC 66); 6

(3)

Articles 5 and 6 of the International Convention
for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 1973,
as modified by the Protocol of 1978 (MARPOL
73/78);'

(4)

Article X of the Standards of Training,
Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers,
19 78 (STCW 78) • 8

The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea9
further expanded the enforcement role of the port State with
3 Internal waters are inland waters landward of the baseline from which the territorial sea is
measured. They include ports, rivers, and meeting certain requirements bays. See articles 8, 9,
10, and 11 of the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea.
• The International Labor Organization Convention Concerning Minimum Standards in
Merchant Shipping, No. 147 (ILO 147), sets competency standards, work hours, manning,
shipboard employment conditions, and living conditions. Under article 4 of the convention, the
port State may board a foreign-flag vessel to investigate complaints related to on board working
conditions, crew health, safety, and welfare, among other things. This topic will not be examined
in this paper. For additional Information on this subject see E. Osieke. "The International Labour
Oraganisation and the Control of Substandard Merchant Vessels." 30 International and
Comparative Law Quarterly 497-512(1981).
5 SOLAS 74f78. 17 ILM 579. SOLAS contains technical standards for safety surveys and
certificates; subdivision and stability; machinery and electrical installations; fire protection,
detection, and extinction; life-saving appliances; radiotelegraphy and radiotelephone; safety of
navigation; carriage of grain and dangerous goods.
6 LLC 66. 640 UNTS 133. LLC contains standards for freeboard and load line assignment as
well as standards for vessel strength and stability.
7 MARPOL 73f78, 12 ILM 1319 (1973), with Protocol 17 ILM 546 (1978). MARPOL 73f78
contains design, construction, equipment, and discharge standards for vessels carrying oil,
noxious liquid substances, sewage and garbage.
8 STCW 78. STCW sets forth minimum standards for crew qualifications, persons in charge of
navigational watches, engineering watches, and radio watch-keeping and maintenance, and sets
out special requirements for personnel on tankers and standards for proficiency in survival craft.
9 UN document A/CONF.62/121 of October 21, 1982. 21 ILM 1261.
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respect to the control of vessel-source pollution, extending
port State enforcement competence to the high seas and the
jurisdictional zones of other states.

The expansion of port

State enforcement jurisdiction resulted from to a compromise
between coastal States, who demanded protection from
environmental harm, and maritime States, who resisted
attempts to impede freedom of navigation.
Traditionally, coastal State 10 competence to prescribe and
enforce pollution control standards aboard foreign-flag
vessel was limited to the territorial sea.

Beyond the

territorial sea (the high seas) the flag State enjoyed
eXClusive jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce such
standards aboard its vessels.

However, a number of major

vessel related pollution incidents in the late 1960s and
early 1970s demonstrated that sole reliance on flag State
jurisdiction would not reduce vessel-source pollution or
protect coastal States from environmental harm.

Frustrated

by the inability to protect their coastal environment from
vessel-source pollution, coastal States demanded the power to
prescribe and enforce pollution control standards aboard
foreign-flag vessels operating beyond their territorial seas.
In recent years, at least two dramatic changes have taken
place.

First, a majority of coastal States extended the

geographic limits of their jurisdiction.

The most important

geographic changes include the extension of the territorial
sea limits from three miles to twelve miles, and the
10 The coastal State is a state that claims jurisdiction over a foreign vessel passing through
waters which it claims jurisdiction. These waters include the territorial sea and the Exclusive
Economic Zone.
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establishment of an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), a zone
extending 200 miles from the shoreline.

Second, the MARPOL

73/78 and the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea granted
States certain new powers to prescribe and enforce vesselsource pollution control standards, dividing such powers
among the port State, the coastal State, and the flag State.
To appease fears that freedom of navigation would be impeded
if coastal States were given unrestricted authority to stop
and board vessels at sea, port States were granted the
competence to board vessels within their ports, internal
waters, and offshore terminals to investigate and prosecute
violations of international pollution control standards
occurring on the high seas and the jurisdictional zones of
other States.
This paper will examine the evolving role of the port State
with regard to the enforcement of international safety of
life at sea and pollution control standards and its effect on
improving maritime safety and reducing vessel-source
pollution.

Chapter 2 will analyze the flag State enforcement

regime, with particular emphasis on flags of convenience or
open registries countries demonstrating the inadequacy of
flag State enforcement and the need for port State control.
Chapter 3 will examine the concept and legal requirements of
the port State control regime.

Chapter 4 will focus on the

role of the port State with respect to the control of vesselsource pollution.

Finally, Chapter 5 will provide a summary

conclusion as to the adequacy and problems of the port State
regime.

4

CHAPTER 2 THE FLAG STATE

REGIME

2.1 INTRODUCTION

It can be said that the emergence of the port State
enforcement regime occurred as a direct result of the failure
of certain flag States to maintain effective control over
their vessels.

Although international law mandates that flag

States implement and enforce maritime safety and pollution
prevention standards aboard their vessels, many open registry
countries frequently fail to do so.

As a result, their

fleets generally contain a disproportionately high number of
substandard vessels.

This chapter will examine the flag

State enforcement regime and its failings, with special
emphasis on open registries.

2.2 DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL MARITIME SAFETY AND
POLLUTION PREVENTION TREATIES

International safety and pollution prevention instruments
establish globally accepted minimum standards.

Among other

things, such standards ensure that ship operators and crews
are not subjected to a multitude of varying (and possibly
conflicting) national laws and regulations.

Moreover, they

ensure fair competition in the international market.
National standards that exceed international design,
equipment, or manning standards increase the cost of building
or operating a vessel, placing those vessels that must comply
5

with the additional standards at an economic disadvantage
with those vessels that do not have to comply with such
standards.
International maritime safety and pollution prevention
conventions are developed under the auspices of the IMO, a
specialized agency of the United Nations.

Since January

1959, the IMO has concluded nearly 30 conventions and
protocols, numerous codes, and hundreds of resolutions
relating to safety of life at sea and pollution control.
Headquartered in London, the organization presently has 135
member countries and two associate member countries.

It is

governed by an Assembly that meets once every two years.

A

Secretary General and a Council, made up of 32 member
governments elected for two-year terms, oversee the
organizations daily operations.

Five committees and numerous

subcommittees carry out the technical work of the IMO.

The

Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) and the Marine Environment
Protection Committee (MEPC) perform the bulk of work relating
to safety of life at sea and environmental protection. l l
Developing international agreements generally involves
achieving a broad consensus among many nations with varying
industrial development, technical capabilities, resources,
and environmental consciousness or concern.

For example,

representatives from 90 states attended the conference
negotiating the International Convention of Oil Pollution
11 On the IMO and its operation see S. Mankabady. The International Maritime Organization.
London: Croom Helm, 1984; W. Lamp. "The "New International Maritime Organization and Its
Place in Development of International Maritime Law." 14 Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce
305·329 (July 1983); D. Sheehan. ''The International Maritime Organization." Proceedings on the
Marine Safety Council 83·85 (April 1987).
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Table 1

status of selected IMO Conventions
As of April 1991

Convention
SaLAS 1974
SaLAS Protocol
COLREGS 72
Load Lines 1966
International
Tonnage Convention
STCW 78
MARPOL 73/7 8
Annex III
Annex IV
Annex V
International
Intervention
Convention, 1969
International Dumping
Convention 1972 (LDC)

Date of entry
into force

No. of
parties

% of
world fleet

1980
1981
1977
1968

111
72
107
117

97.14
91.15
96.00
98.13

18 July 1982
28 April 1984
10 Oct. 1983

31 Dec. 1988

90
81
64
43
37
49

96.55
77.10
88.19
47.82
38.09
64.78

6 May 1975

57

68.67

30 Aug. 1975

63

63.07

25 May
1 May
15 July
21 July

Source: united Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)
Review of Maritime Transport 1990

7

Preparedness, Response, and Cooperation.

The convention-

making process involves four stages: (1) negotiation; (2)
provisional acceptance; (3) final acceptance - ratification;
and (4) entry into force. 12

Once the text of a treaty has

been negotiated, the text is presented to the IMO assembly
for adoption.

Following the Assembly's approval, the

instrument is then presented at a conference (open to
delegations from United Nations member States) for adoption
and signature.

Following this stage, the Convention is

presented to individual governments for ratification.

For

example, in the United States a convention must receive the
uadvice and consent U of two-thirds of the Senate and the
approval of the President.
formal approval.

Ratification signifies a nation's

A State that accepts or ratifies an

international is legally bound to implement and enforce its
standards.

In certain cases, a state must enact implementing

legislation before a convention becomes effective
domestically. 13
A convention enters into force when a certain number of
nations have ratified the agreement, usually specified in the
agreement's text.

For example, Article 15 of the MARPOL

73/78 states:
uThe present Convention shall enter into force twelve
months after the date on which not less than 15 States,
the combined merchant fleets of which constitute not
less than fifty per cent of the gross tonnage of the
world's merchant shipping, have become parties to it

"
12

G. von

13

On this point see G. von Glahn, supra note 12, p. 568.

Glahn, Law Among Nations (New York: Macmillan PUblishing Company, 1992), p.

564.
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2.3

FLAG STATE COMPLIANCE

Every State has the right to sail ships flying its flag on
the high seas. 14

Under international law, a state exercising

this right must exercise appropriate control and jurisdiction
over its ships .15

This is accomplished, in part, by ensuring

that they are designed, constructed, equipped, maintained,
manned, and operated in accordance with internationally
accepted standards.

Further, the flag State is responsible

for the training and certification of officers and crews, the
investigation of accidents, and the prosecution of violations
of national and international regulations and standards. 1 6
To fulfill its obligations, a State must establish an
effective maritime safety program, which should include: (1)
a properly organized maritime safety administration, staffed
by trained personnel; (2) administrative regulations that
implement the relevant IMO conventions; (3) an inspection
program with an adequate number of trained and experienced
inspectors; and (3) facilities for training, educating, and
certifying its seamen.

Flag States that do not have

established maritime safety programs cannot carry out their
obligations under international law. 17
Recently, the IMO identified four reasons why flag States
14 The 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas, artide 4. 450 UNTS 82. Entered into
force on 30 September 1962. Also, the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note
9, article 90.
15 Ibid, Convention on the High Seas, article 10. Also, the 1982 UN Convention on the Law
of the Sea, article 94.
16 Ibid .
17 "Implementation of Instruments and Related Matters ." MSC 60/11/3 dated 14 February
1991.

9

typically fail to exercise control over their vessels:
(1) "they lack an sufficient number of trained and
experienced technical personnel;
(2) they lack sufficient infrastructure to properly
interpret and support application and enforcement of
international conventions;
(3) there is unclear delegation of authority and
regulatory oversight when inspections and surveys
are entrusted either to surveyors nominated for that
purpose or to Organizations recognized by the
Administration or the employment of insufficiently
qualified and experienced surveyors under such
arrangements;
(4) there is an absence of effective control or
oversight programs to ensure that consistent and
competent maritime safety actions are taken. ,,18

2.3. 1 SUBSTANDARD FLAGS

The vast majority of open registry countries and developing
countries have accepted or ratified key IMO instruments
( .i , e., SOLAS, LLC, MARPOL). 19

However, because these flag

categories often lack, maritime expertise, finances, skilled
personnel, technology, and infrastructure, they frequently
fail to exercise control over their vessels, although there
are some exceptions.

consequently, vessels registered under

these flag categories are more likely to be substandard. 20
An analysis of 1989-1991 Paris MOU inspection data seems to
support this hypothesis.

The data reveal that vessels

18 "Report
19 "

of the 59th Session of the Maritime Safety Committee." MSC 59/33, p. 84.
Implementation of Instruments and Related Matters." MSC 60/11/8 dated 3 January

1992.
20 For example, see M. Titz. "Port state control versus marine environmental pollution." 16
Maritime Policy Management (1989) 189-211 (1989); "OECD Study on Flags of Convenience."
GECD Maritime Transport 231-254(1971).

10

Table 221

Paris r-DU
Flag States with higher than average delay/
detention rates 1989-1991, expressed as a percentage.

1991

Flag

1990

average
%
of vsls. detent .
detain. %
Flag

Ranania
St Vincent
& Grenadines
Malta
Iran
Lebanon
Honduras
Syrian Arab
Republic
India
Panama
Cyprus
Myanmar
Liberia
Brazil
Spain
Egypt
Antigua &
Barbuda
Bahamas
Isle of Man
Algeria

22.95

5.20

16.17
15.99
12.50
12.00
11. 76

5.20
5.20
5.20
5.20
5.20

10.00
10.00
9.24
7.65
7.41
7.14
6.67
6.67
6.56

5.20
5.20
5.20
5.20
5.20
5.20
5.20
5.20
5.20

6 .44
6.39
6.25
6 .06

5.20
5.20
5.20
5.20

~

%
average
of vsla. detent.
detain. %
Flag

Morocco
22.73
St Vincent
& Grenadines
16.79
Honduras
16.26
15.33
Malta
14.41
Ranania
12.96
Egypt
Lebanon
11.11
9.46
India
8.53
Turkey
Italy
7.59
Cyprus
7.24
S. Korea
6.25
Panama
6.15
China People's
Republic
5.41
Liberia
4.59

4.48
4.48
4.48
4.48
4.48
4.48
4.48
4.48
4.48
4.48
4.48
4.48
4.48
4.48
4.48

Honduras
24.00
st. Vincent
Grenadines 22.32
Brazil
17.86
13.64
Iran
Egypt
11.54
10.73
Malta
10.53
Ranania
Lebanon
9.09
Portugal
8.00
Cyprus
7.60
7.46
India
Antigua
& Barbuda
6.43
6.41
Italy
Morocco
5.56
Isle of Man 4.55
4.52
Turkey
4.35
Iceland
4.29
Panama
China
People's
4.00
Republic
4.00
Spain
UK

Sourcel Paris MOU Annual Reports 1989-1991.

21 Includes flag States with more than 20 individual ship boardings.
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average
%
of vsls. detent.
detain.
%

3.79

3.75
3.75
3.75
3.75
3.75
3.75
3.75
3.75
3.75
3.75
3.75
3.75
3.75
3.75
3.75
3.75
3.75
3.75
3.75
3.75
3.75

registered in open registry States (and developing States)
routinely experience higher than average delay/detention
rates when compared to vessels registered in regulated or
traditional maritime States.

See Table 2.

By contrast,

vessels registered under traditional flags, including Paris
MOU member States, averaged somewhat lower delay/detention
rates.

For example, in 1991 Denmark experienced a 1 percent

delay/detention rate (2 percent in 1990), Germany a 2 percent
rate (2 percent in 1990), Japan 0 percent (.03 percent in
1990), Greece a 5 percent (3 percent in 1990), and the United

States a 4 percent rate (4 percent in 1990).22

Similarly, the

data show that substandard conditions appear more frequently
aboard vessels registered in open registry States and
developing States.

For example, in 1991, 62 flag States had

a higher than average (45.58 percent) number of inspections
with deficiencies.

Ninety percent of those flag States were

open registry States and developing States. 23
The highest number of deficiencies uncovered by Paris MOU
member States involve lifesaving equipment (31.12 percent in
1991; 26.13 percent in 1990; 25.25 percent in 1989) and

firefighting equipment (15.66 percent in 1991; 16.97 in 1990;
17.93 percent in 1989).

According to the Paris MOU 1991

annual report, the main cause of the majority of deficiencies
resulted from a lack of proper maintenance (this has also
been observed in previous years). 24

Lack of proper

maintenance can result from many factors, including vessel
age, crew size, and owner or operator maintenance philosophy
22
23
24

Paris MOU Annual Report (1991), pp. 48-50.
Ibid., pp. 57-60.
Ibid., p. 28.
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and management practices.

However, one could also state that

it is indicative of a lack of adequate governmental
oversight.
The next section will examine special problems associated
with open registry flags.
2.4 OPEN REGISTRIES z5

2. 4 • 1 DEFINED

Every State has the right to sail ships flying its flag on
the high seas.

Under the 1958 Convention on the High Seas

each State determines for itself "the conditions for the
grant of its nationality to ships, for the registration of
ships in its territory, and for the right to fly its flag.

,,26

The Convention states that "there must exist a genuine link
between the State and the ship; in particular, the State must
effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control in
administrative, technical, and social matters over ships
flying its flag. ,,27

However, the Convention never defined the

term genuine link, leaving registration and control
requirements imprecise and open to interpretation by
individual States.
As a result of this lack of definition, certain States opened
25 On this subject also see B. Metaxas. Flags of Convenience . London: Gower, 1985; B.
Boczek. Flags of Convenience. An International Legal Study. Cambridge; Harvard University,
1962; G. Kasoulides . "The 1986 United Nations Convention on the Conditions for Registration of
Vessels and the Question of Open Registry." 20 Ocean Development and International Law
543·576 (1989); G. Egiyan. "Rag of convemence or open registration of ships." 14 Marine Policy
10&111 (1990);
26 Convention on the High Seas, supra note 14, articles 5 and 6.
27 Ibid., article 5(1).
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Table 3

Major open registry fleets
As of 1 July 1991

Flag

No of Vsls.

1,605
Liberia
Panama
4,953
Cyprus
1,359
Bahamas
973
Malta
702
Bermuda
100
St. Vincent
698
Vanuatu
287
Gibraltar
44
Isle of Man
114
Marshall Islands
28
846
Honduras
Antigua & Barbuda
241
Cayman Islands
155
Total
12,105

Deadweight
tonnage CDWT)

% of
world fleet

93,640,374
72,169,724
36,526,992
28,798,214
11,852,963
5,193,756
4,221,099
3,328,686
2,695,106
1,937,529
1,698,051
1.225.100
811,176
538,967
264,311,905

13.70
10.50
5.33
4.20
1. 70
.75
.62
.48
.39
.27
.25
.17
.12
.07
38.55

Source: Lloyd's Register Statistical Tables, 1991
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their registries to ships owned and operated by foreign
companies to generate revenue from ship registration fees.
They imposed few conditions for registry and generally lacked
the capability to effectively control vessels registered
under their flag.

Countries that conducted such practices

became known as flag of convenience or open registry
countries.

The Rochdale Committee provided a comprehensive

definition of the term open registry in 1970, as follows:
•

the country of registry allows ownership and/or
control of its merchant vessels by non-citizens;

•

access to the registry is easy; a ship may usually
be registered at a consulate abroad. Equally
important transfer from the registry at the owner's
option is not restricted;

• taxes on the income from the ships are not levied
locally, or are very low. A registry fee and an
annual fee, based on tonnage, are normally the only
charges made. A guarantee or acceptable
understanding regarding future freedom from taxation
also be given;
•

the country of registry is a small power with no
national requirement under any foreseeable
circumstances for all the shipping registered, but
receipts from very small charges on a large tonnage
may produce a substantial effect on its national
income and balance of payments;

• manning of ships by non-nationals is freely
permitted;
• the country of registry has neither the power nor the
administrative machinery effectively to impose any
government or international regulations; not has the
country even the wish to control the companies
themselves .28
28 G. Kasoulides, "The 1986 United Nations Convention on the Conditions for Registration
of Vessels and the Question of Open Registry," 20 Ocean Development and International Law
(1989), pp. 544·545.

15

The committee believed that all conditions must exist for a
flag to be considered open, but, as a practical matter, no
open registries meet all the conditions and need not do so.
From a vessel owner's point of view, open registry flags
provide many distinct advantages the most important of which
is lower operating costs, including lower crew costs.

Other

advantages include freedom to recruit crews of any
nationality, freedom from national manning scales and
regulation, freedom from restriction on raising capital,
freedom from income taxes, preferential trading
opportunities, less red tape, freedom from strict safety
regulations, and liberal manning and crew qualification.
2.4 • 2 BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP

Since the mid-1940s, open registry fleets have increased
dramatically in size from about 4 percent of world gross
registered tonnage (GRT) to about 34 percent of world GRT
today.29

As a result, the fleets of traditional maritime

nations have declined significantly, as vessel owners
transferred their vessels to open registry fleets.
Nevertheless, despite this trend, ownership of the world
fleet remains largely concentrated in a small number of
mostly traditional maritime nations.

For example, in July

1990, 68.94 percent of the world fleet was owned or
controlled by parent companies domiciled in just 10
count.r.i.es ;"

Moreover, shipowners from just two countries

• p. 548.
UNCTAD, Review of Marine Transport (1990), p. 8. Also see figure 1 for a listing of those
countries.
29 Ibid.
30
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Figure 1
The national and foreign fleets of
ten most important maritime countries.
As of 1 July 1990

• NatiooaII1ag

. roognl1ag

Millions of DWT
Adapted from the UNCTAD Review of Maritime
Transport 1990
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Table 4

True ownership of five major open registry fleets
expressed as a % of DWT
As of 1 July 1990

Major open registry fleets
True Country
or Territory
of domicile

Liberia
% of
DWT

Panama
% of
DWT

Cyprus
%.of
DWT

Bahamas
%.of
DWT

Greece
Japan
u.s.
Hong Kong
Norway
U.K.
Germany
S. Korea
Taiwan
China
Finland
France
switzerland
Pakistan
Singapore
Denmark
Belgium
Sweden
Subtotal
Others
Total

13.2
13 .5
23.2
16.0
10.0
6.2
3.5
1.5
.7
1.1
0.0
.6
1.0
1.5
.6
.7
.9
.5
94.7
5.3
100.0

10.7
39.8
3.0
14.3
3.2
1.7
3.2
4.7
4.0
3.5
.1
.4
1.0
.1
1.5
.9
0.0
0.0
92.2
7.8
100.0

58.9
0.2
1.1
1.5
4.4
1.0
4.8
0.0
2.2
0.0
.9
0.0
1.4
0.0
0.0
.2
.7
0.0
77.1
22.9
100.0

13 .5
3.9
23.9
1.7
12.0
7.0
.2
0.0
.3
0.0
9.9
6.2
.7
1.9
1.8
2.3
2.4
4.6
92.4
7.6
100.0

Bermuda
% of
DWT
13.2
49.6
3.0
30.2
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
96.1
3.9
100.0

Adapted from UNCTAD, Review of Maritime Transport 1990
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Combined
% of
DWT
19.2
17.1
15.6
11.3 63.2
7.3
5.3
3.1
1.9
1.7
1.5 84.0
1.2
1.0
1.0
.9
.9
.8
.7
.7
91.3
8.7
100.0

- Greece and Japan - owned or controlled 27 percent of world
tonnage. 31
Ownership of the open registry fleets is concentrated in a
relatively small number of mostly traditional maritime
countries.

Table 4 provides a breakdown of national

ownership of five major open registry fleets, as of July
1990.

The table shows that 84 percent of the DWT registered

in the five open registry countries is owned by parent
companies located in just ten countries.

Owners domiciled in

three countries and one territory - Greece, the United
States, Japan, and Hong Kong - owned 63.2 percent of the
combined tonnage of these open registry flags.

32

2. 4 • 3 FLEET LOSSES

Generally, vessels registered under open registry flags
suffer higher loss rates than vessels registered under
traditional maritime flags.

Historically, open registry

fleets have sustained loss rates two to four times higher
than traditional maritime fleets, although the record of some
open registry fleets such as Liberia have improved somewhat
in recent years. D
Within the last two decades worldwide total vessel loss rates
have declined significantly. 34

Nonetheless, open registry

fleet tonnage and vessel losses remain high.

For example,

Ibid.
Ibid., p. 15 and Table 4.
33 See, for example, ....OECD Study on Flags of Convenience." OECD Maritime Transport
231-254 (1971); "Loss Records of ships flying flags of Convenience 1969-1973." OECD Maritime
Transport 88-103 (1974).
34 National Research Council, Crew Size and Maritime Safety (Washington DC: National
Academy of Science, 1990), p. 21.
31

32
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Figure 2

Number of vessels lost between 1970-1991
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Source: Lloyd's Register Annual Casualty Returns 1991
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Table 5
A comparison of open regi stry (OR) 3~ and developed
countr y 36 (DEV) fleet gross tonnage (GT) losses.

Year
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991

OR GT
losses
as %
of world
GT losses
58.89
48.27
51. 70
46.01
48.47
47.26

OR
GT
as %
of world
GT

DEV
fleet losses
as %
of world
GT losses

27.29
29.59
30.14
30.44
29.72
31.00

DEV
fleet GT
as %
of world
GT
36.65
32.58
33.98
33.44
34.16
32.89

19.01
25.13
25 .79
19.90
30.87
22.01

Source: Lloyd's Register Statistical Tables 1991
Lloyd's Register Annual Casualty Returns 1991

Table 6
Countries with the highest vessel
and GT losses between 1986-1991

Flag

No.
vsl.
lost

%
of world
vsl losses

GT lost

%
of world
GT lost

Liberia
Cyprus
Panama
S. Korea
Greece

27
68
170
69
39

1.97
4.95
12.39
5.03
2.84

1,392,722
1,091,277
979,130
478,047
633,988

17.19
13 .47
12.09
5.91
7.83

Total

373

27.18

4,575,164

56.49

Source: Lloyd's Annual Casualty Review 1991

35 Includes

Bahamas, Cyprus, Gibraltar, Liberia, Malta, Panama, Saint Vincent, and Vanuatu.
Includes Australia, Canada. Denmark, Rnland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan,
Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, UK, and USA.
38
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Table 5 shows that open registry tonnage losses are almost
twice those of developed country fleets.

Moreover, between

1986 and 1991, open registry fleets accounted for 50 percent
of tonnage and 25 percent of ships lost, although they
accounted for only 30 percent of the tonnage and about 12
percent of the ships. 37

The three largest open registry

fleets - Liberia, Panama, and Cyprus - sustained the highest
tonnage losses during this period, with a combined total of
42 .75 percent (19. 31 percent of the ships lost). 38
2.4.4 RELIABILITY

Samir Mankabady cataloged ten reasons why nonobservance of
international safety and pollution standards may be greater
under an open registry flag:
(1) Real owners are not readily identifiable, therefore
owners are more likely to take risk;
(2) Real owners can easily and frequently change their
identification, thereby avoiding identification as repeated
substandard operators or risk-takers;
(3) Since the masters, officers, and crews are not
nationals of the flag State they are more likely to avoid
legal action;
(4) Owners who reside outside the jurisdiction to the
flag State can defy its requests to testify at an inquiry and
thereby avoid prosecution;
(5) Open registry owners are less likely to cooperate
with inspectors from the flag State, because of a lack of
incentive to preserve good relations with the flag State;
(6) Open registry shipping lacks union structure which
is essential to the application of safety and social
standards;
(7) Open registry owners are in a better position to put
pressure on masters and officers to take risks, since there
37
38

Lloyd's Register Annual Casualty Returns 1986·1991 (London: Lloyd's, 1986 -199 1)
See Table 6.
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is rarely a government authority to which shipboard personnel
can complain;
(8) Port State control is less effective because the
port State can only report substandard vessels and practices
to flag State which has no real control over the owner;
(9) Owners can easily manipulate their crews because of
the ability to change nationalities of crews at whim;
(10) Enforcement of standards is inconsistent with the
operation of a registry with the sole aim of making a
prof Lt ;"

Moreover, control by open registry countries is further
hampered by the fact that ships registered under these flags
rarely call at ports under the jurisdiction of the flag
State, making it difficult for those governments to exercise
control over them.
2. 4.5 CAPABILITIES

The ability and commitment of open registry countries to
exercise control over their ships vary considerably.

Some

States, for example Liberia, have implemented strict
regulations with respect to ship safety, manning, and crew
qualifications and have established worldwide inspection and
seamen certification programs.

However, others, particularly

recent entrants, have embryonic maritime administrations and
liberal safety, manning, and crew qualification requirements.
Examples of the latter are Antigua and Barbuda and the
Republic of Vanuatu. 40

A number of States offer financial and

other advantages that are similar to those of open registry
countries (and considered open registries by some), but with
ill

S. Mankabady, The International Maritime Organisation (London: Croom Helm, 1984), pp.

17-18.
40 US House of Representatives: Subcommittee on Education and Labor. Hearin~ on H.R.
3283, a Bill to Extend the Coverage of Certain Federal Laws to Foreign Flags. 101thong., tst
sess. , 1989, pp. 288-301.
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regard to safety, manning, and crew certification fall under
the jurisdiction of a traditional maritime country.

For

example, Bermuda, Cayman Islands, Isle of Man and Gibraltar
are part of the British registry and are subject to British
maritime law.
Few open registry countries have adequately sized maritime
administrations or the staff to operate them.

The Bahamian

maritime administration, for example, is staffed with just 10
persons (even though 1991 it had the fourth largest open
registry fleet). 41

Consequently, some open registry countries

appoint private organizations to administer their maritime
safety programs.

For example, Liberian Services Inc., a

Reston, Virginia-based private maritime service company,
administers the Liberian maritime program.

The company

conducts world-wide inspections, crew licensing, and casualty
investigations on behalf of the Liberian government, although
most of these functions are contracted out to other
inspection entities.

Almost all open registries delegate

some or all of their inspection duties to classification
societies, for example the American Bureau of Shipping and
Lloyd's Register, or other inspection authorities.

While

this has enabled these States to provide worldwide coverage,
it has created other problems.
Classification societies are private entities that establish
rules and standards for the design, the construction, and the
machinery of ships and other marine structures and conduct
hull, machinery, electrical, and ship control surveys on
41

Ibid.• p. 291.
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behalf of shipowners and insurance companies to determine
seaworthiness for insurance purposes. 42

Because many of these

organizations have maritime experience, technical expertise,
and world-wide inspection capabilities, many open registry
countries have delegated their responsibilities under SOLAS,
LLC, MARPOL and other instruments to classification
societies, authorizing them to conduct periodic surveys and
issue certificates.

Also, open registry countries allow

classification societies to interpret conventions for them
because they lack administrative or technical capacity to do
so.
However, many international observers have criticized the use
of classification societies by flag States for several
reasons. 4 3

First, these organizations are typically employed

(and paid) by both the ship owner (to verify compliance with
classification rules) and the flag State (to enforce
international standards on behalf of the flag State).

Many

believe that this creates a conflict of interest, making it
difficult for classification societies to objectively enforce
international standards.

Moreover, enforcing IMO standards

requires the classification surveyor to assume the role of
that of policemen, which many are reluctant to do,
particularly when the ship owner is paying the bill.

Second,

42 For more on classification societies see U.S. Coast Guard, Report of the Tanker Safety
Study Group , p. 23; R. M'Goni~le and M. Zacher, Pollution. Politics. and International Law
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), pp. 330-332.
43 On this point see, A. Abrams, "Tanker Inspections Are Questioned By Oil Executives,"
The Journal of Commerce, June 3, 1992, p. 8b; J. Porter, "Norwegian Ship Classification Group
Leads Move to Simplify Inspections," The Journal of Commerce, June 3, 1992, P 8B; A.
Abrams, "Cruise Ship Case Raises Doubts About Vessel Inspection Process," The Journal of
Cornmerce, July 8, 1992, p. 1A; J. Porter, "Classification Societies Try to Clean House," The
Journal of Commerce. October 19, 1992, J). 1C; J. Kime, "The Port State - The Shipping
Aspect," International Summit. Safety At Sea Conference. Oslo. Norway (1991); "OECD Study
on Flags of Convenience," OECD Maritime Transport 231-254(1971).
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many observers contend that classification society are
reluctant to enforce maritime safety and pollution prevention
standards because of intense competition among the societies
for business.

A classification society that earns a

reputation for being too tough may loose business to other
classification societies.

Finally, classification societies

lack the necessary knowledge or expertise, particularly in
the area of lifesaving equipment, fire safety equipment, and
navigation requirements.
2.5 CONCLUSIONS

In recent years, a large number of shipowners have
transferred their vessels from traditional maritime States to
open registry States.

As pointed out in this chapter, many

of the latter states fail for a variety of reasons to
exercise effective control over their vessels, as required
under international law.

Consequently, the number of

substandard vessels, vessel casualties, and vessel-source
pollution incidents remains high, particularly among open
registry States.

One way of improving safety of life at sea

and reducing vessel source pollution is through increased
governmental oversight.

Port State Control provides a means

of achieving this additional oversight by empowering the port
State to verify that vessels using its ports are in
compliance with the applicable international standards.

It

should be pointed out that the port State control regime is
not intended to replace the flag State as the primary
enforcement authority, rather it supplements the latter's
authority.

The next chapter will examine the concept and

legal requirements of the port State control regime.
26

CHAPTER 3 PORT STATE CONTROL
OVER SUBSTANDARD SHIPS
3.1 PORT STATE CONTROL

Port state control may be defined as the control of a
foreign-flag vessel by a port State within its ports,
internal waters and at its offshore terminals seas for
violations of international standards.

More precisely, port

State control empowers port States to board, examine, and, if
necessary, detain foreign-flag vessels while visiting their
ports for violations of international standards relating to
vessel safety, pollution control, manning, crew competence,
and on-board crew living and working conditions.

It should

be emphasized that a port State may not exercise control on
the high seas.
The concept of port State control with respect to safety of
life at sea and pollution prevention is embodied in the
following IMO conventions:
(1)

Regulation 19 of Chapter 1 of the 1974 Safety
of Life at Sea Convention, as amended in 1978
(SOLAS 74/78);

(2)

Article 21 of the 1966 Load Line Convention
(LLC 66);

(3)

Articles 5 and 6 of the International Convention
for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 1973,
as modified by the Protocol of 1978 (MARPOL
73/78);

(4)

Article X of the Standards of Training,
27

Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers, 1978
(STeW 78).
Prior to the mid-1970s, there was no significant practice of
port State control, although the idea had been around for
many years. 44

In the late 1960s and the early 1970s, a number

of catastrophic ship casualties, particularly involving
vessels flagged under open registries, revealed that these
flag States lacked the capability to either implement or
enforce safety standards aboard their vessels, worse many of
them were not even party to the relevant IMO conventions.

In

response to pUblic outcry, some open registry countries,
notably Liberia and Panama, introduced worldwide inspection
programs and tightened their regulations; 4~ however, the
majority of other open registry countries lacked the
resources or technical skills or, in some cases, the will to
implement effective maritime safety programs.

Consequently,

the concept of port State control was introduced into the
enforcement regime to supplement flag State control.
In November 1975, the IMO adopted a set of guidelines
prepared by its Maritime Safety Committee, which encouraged
port States to make more effective use of their control
powers under the SOLAS and the LLC conventions. 46
Additionally, both MARPOL 73/78 and the STeW conventions
include provisions for port State control.

Over the years,

the IMO has issued a number of nonbinding resolutions

4" The principle of port State control can be traced back to the 1914 International Convention
of Safety of Life at Sea. M. Titz, "Port state control versus marine environmental pollution ," 16
Maritime Policy Management (1989), p.191. For an excellent review of the history of port State
jurisdiction. see R. Legatski. "Port State Jurisdiction Over Vessels-source Marine Pollution." 2
Harvard Environmental Law Review 448-473 (1977).
45 D. Abecassis, Oil Pollution from Ships (London : Butterworths, 1978), p. 56.
46 IMO Resolution A.321(IX) dated 12 November 1975.
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detailing port State inspection guidelines under these
treaties.

3.1.1 INSPECTION

Under the terms of the aforementioned treaties, a port State
may initiate a control action (1) to verify whether a vessel
possesses valid certificates, as required by the applicable
Conventions,47 or (2) to investigate a complaint by a
crewmember, a professional body, an association, or any other
individual or organization with interest in the safety of the
ship, its crew or passengers.

If a vessel's certificates are

in order, a port State surveyor generally may not conduct a
physical inspection of a ship unless there are "clear
grounds" for believing that it does not meet the requirements
of the applicable conventions.

Generally, "clear grounds"

may exist when, in the judgment of the inspector, the
condition of a ship or its equipment indicate serious
deficiencies or a lack of proper maintenance, which would
render a ship substandard or a threat to the marine
environment.

Inspections related to the investigation of

deficiencies reported by a master or crew

48

or other

individuals or organizations must generally be limited to
reported deficiencies, unless the "clear grounds" criterion
is determined.
A ship that does not fully comply with the relevant
47 These certificates include the Cargo Ship Safety Construction Certificate, the Cargo Ship
Safety Equipment Certificate, the Passenger Ship Safety Certificate, the Radiotelegraphy and
Radiotelephony Certificates, the Load Line Certificate, and International Oil Pollution Certificate,
among others.
48 Under SaLAS and MAR POL, officers and crews are required to inform the port State of
defects that substantially affect the integrity of the ship.
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international standards may be classified as substandard and
is subject to delay or detention until such time as the
deficiency is corrected.

More specifically, a ship may be

considered substandard if one or more of the following
conditions exists:
(1)

a vessel lacks the required

(2)

the hull, machinery or equipment such as
life-saving, radio, and fire-fighting are below
Convention standards~

(3)

a ship or its equipment is substantially
deteriorated due to poor maintenance practices~

(4)

a ship is insufficiently manned;

(5)

noncompliance with the operational requirements
of applicable conventions;

(6)

crew living and working conditions are below the
relevant standards~

(7)

any condition is found to exist that would render
the ship unseaworthy or would put at risk the life
of persons on board or would create a threat to the
marine environment it were allowed to proceed to
saa ;"

certificates~

If the required certificates are not on board or not valid,
or if there are uclear grounds" for believing that the ship
does not substantially meet the requirements of the relevant
conventions, a more detailed inspection may be carried out.
Guidelines for port State control inspections under SOLAS and
HARPOL are found in the following nonbinding IMO resolutions
and document:
(1) IMO resolution A.466(XII), Procedures for the
Control of Ships~
(2) IMO resolution A.•542 (13) Procedures for the
Control of Ships and Discharges under Annex I
411

IMO Resolution A.466(XII), pp. 19-23.
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of MARPOL 73/78;
(3) MEPC 26(23), Procedures for the

Control of Ships and Discharges under Annex II
of MARPOL 73/78.
Since IMO resolutions and MEPC documents are nonbinding on
Contracting parties, individual port States have considerable
latitude in applying them.

Consequently, inspections may

vary from State to State.

Nevertheless, an inspection will

generally involve an examination of one or more of the
following areas:
•

hull, superstructure, and weatherdecks to ascertain
structural integrity;

• watertight hatches and closing appliances, and other
deck openings such as air pipes and vent coamings to
determine the watertighness;
•

lifesaving, fire fighting appliances and navigational
equipment including radio installations and
navigational charts and publications;

• main and auxiliary machinery, steering systems, and
electrical installations;
• cargo piping and pumping systems, including tank
venting systems and pollution prevention equipment,
including crude oil washing systems, inert gas
systems, and equipment designed to control the
discharge of oil or hazardous substances such as on
deck containment systems and oily water separating
equipment. se
The following discrepancies may result in a vessel being
detained in port:
•
50 IMO

significant areas of damage or corrosion of shell
or deck plating and their internal members if such
Resolution A.466(XII).
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damage or corrosion affects strength or
seaworthiness;
• missing or seriously deteriorated or damaged
lifeboats, liferafts, ring buoys or lifejackets;
•

inoperative fire pumps or fixed fire fighting
systems, or missing or expired fire extinguishers
or emergency gear;

•

serious deficiencies related to the main or auxiliary
propulsion equipment or steering system, or an
inoperative emergency generator;

• evidence of a lack of good safety or housekeeping
practices in machinery spaces areas such as frayed or
disconnected wires, missing valve handwheels,
inoperative gauges, rusted relief valves, evidence of
chronic steam, water and oil leaks, extensive
corrosion of machinery foundations, large number of
temporary repairs such as cement boxes, inoperative
or disconnected safety or control devices,
malfunctioning or inoperative automatic equipment and
alarm systems. '1
3.1.2 MANNING

Ships subject to SOLAS are required to carry a safe manning
document. '2

This document specifies a ship's minimum manning

level, as established by the flag State in accordance with
the following instruments:
(1) SOLAS 74/78;
(2) STCW 78;
(3) IMO Resolution A.481(XII), principles of Safe
Manning: Annex 1, Contents of Minimum Safe
Manning document; Annex 2, Guidelines for the
application of principles of Safe Manning;
(4) ILO 147.
51

Ibid .

5Z

SOLAS 74/78 , supra note 5, Chapter V, regulation 13(b)
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Generally, the port State must accept a vessel's safe manning
document as evidence that it is safely manned unless the
document has clearly been issued without regard to the
principles outlined in the above instruments or the actual
crew number or composition does not conform to the document.
In the latter case, the port State must notify the flag State
and request a determination as to whether the ship can sail
with the actual number of crew and composition. 5 3

If the ship

does not carry a safe manning document and the port State is
not satisfied that the ship is safely manned it must notify
the vessel's flag State and request that it define the
minimum number of crewmembers and composition.

If the flag

State does not reply, then the port State must evaluate
whether the ship can safely sail with its crew compliment.
3.1.3 OPERATIONAL CONTROL

Traditionally, port State control inspections have centered
on the examination of vessels and their equipment; relatively
little attention was paid to shipboard operations.

However,

a number of recent accidents have suggested that many
officers and crews are not familiar with the operation of
essential shipboard equipment or routine operational
procedures.

Moreover, many vessels rarely call at flag State

ports, making it difficult for many flag States maintain
oversight over operational procedures, except during annual
flag State inspections.

Consequently, IMO adopted resolution

A.681(XVII), Procedures For The Control Of Operational
Requirements Related To The Safety of Ships and Pollution
53

IMO Resolution A.481 (XII).
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Prevention, on 6 November 1991.

The nonbinding resolution

states that when there are "clear grounds" for believing that
the officers and crew are not familiar with essential
shipboard procedures then port State control should be
extended to include operational requirements in respect of
the safety of ships and of pollution prevention. ,,54

"Clear

grounds" are defined as:
•

"evidence of operational shortcomings revealed during
port State control procedures in accordance with
SOLAS 74/78, MARPOL 73/78 AND STCW 78;

•

evidence of cargo and other operations not being
conducted safely or in accordance with IMO
guidelines;

•

involvement of the ship in incidents due to failure
to comply with operational requirements;

•

evidence, from observation of a fire and abandon ship
drill, that the crew are not familiar with essential
procedures;

•

absence of an up-to-date muster list;

•

indications that key crewmembers may not be able to
communicate with each other or with other persons on
board. ,,55

The port State may conduct such onboard operational
procedures as it deems necessary to ascertain the ability of
the crew to perform basic operations essential to safety and
pollution prevention.

Such examinations or test may include:

(1) witnessing a fire and boat drill to determine familiarity
with fire and lifesaving equipment; (2) ascertaining if
officers in charge of a navigational watch are familiar with
bridge control and navigational equipment; and (3)
determining whether personnel assigned to perform cargo
54
55

IMO Resolution A.681(XVII), p. 2.
Ibid., pp. 3-4.
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operations are familiar with the operation of cargo systems.
Having observed the crew's performance, the port State
inspector then has to "exercise his professional judgment to
determine whether the operational proficiency of the crew as
a whole is of sufficient level to allow the ship to sail
without a major risk or whether a better level of proficiency
should be required. ,,'6

Procedures for detaining a vessel are

found in IMO resolution A.481(XII).
3.1.4 Non-convention ships

Several international conventions - SOLAS 74/78"MARPOL 73/78
and STCW 78 - require port States to ensure that non-party
ships are afforded "no more favorable treatment" than that
given to ships of party states.

This means that ships from

non-party states must comply with the requirements of the
applicable Conventions when calling at a port of a party
state.

Consequently, port States must inspect vessels of

non-party States in the same manner as ships from party
States.
3.1.5 DETENTION

Generally, deficiencies discovered during a port State
inspection must be corrected prior to a vessel's departure
from port.

In the case of a deficiencies that is clearly

hazardous to safety, health, or the environment, the port
State is obligated to detain a vessel until such time as the
discrepancies are rectified."

However, in the case of minor

deficiencies a vessel may be allowed to leave port if in the

56
57

ibld
I 0' po 6 0
SOLAS 74f78, article 19; LLC 66, article 21; MARPOL 73/78, article 5; STCW 78, article
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x.

judgment of the attending inspector or the port State
authority the deficiencies do not affect a vessel's
seaworthiness, or endanger passengers or crew or cause a
vessel to pose a threat to the marine environment.

With the

exception of the MARPOL convention, IMO instruments (i.e.,
SOLAS, LLC, and STCW) do not provide for monetary fines or
criminal sanctions.

It should be noted, however, that a port

State may impose such sanctions under the authority of
national legislation, if such legislation provides for them.
When a port State delays or detains a vessel in port it costs
an owner or operator money and time.

These costs include:

(1) the cost of ship's time, (2) the dollar cost of
correcting or repairing deficiencies, and (3) long-term loss
of shippers' goodwill.

consequently, the use of this

enforcement technique provides a real incentive to vessel
owners and operators to properly maintain their vessels.
3.1.6 REPORTING

When a port State exercises control giving rise to an
intervention it must inform the consul or other recognized
representative of the flag State of Uall the circumstances in
which intervention was deemed necessary.u'8

If the port State

is unable to take action for any reason or the ship has been
allowed to proceed to the next port of call for repairs, the
port State must notify the authorities at the next port of
call. '9

58
59

IMO Resolution A.466(XII). p. 14.
SOLAS 74/78, supra note 5, chapter 1, regulation 19(e).
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3. 1 • 7 REPORTS TO IHO

Under SOLAS 74/78, a port State must submit a report to the
IMO's Maritime safety committee (MSC) following a control
action. 6 0

These reports give specific details of the name of

the ship, year build, and other technical specifications and
the action taken by the port State.

In addition, flag States

are requested to forward comments to the MSC regarding the
status of outstanding deficiencies. 61

The MSC periodically

publishes a list of these reports together with flag State
comments and outstanding deficiencies and distributes them to
its Contracting Parties.
Few Contracting Parties submit the reports required by SOLAS
874/78.

For example, between July 1984 and September 1991

the MSC received 1496 individual reports detailing some 8393
deficiencies.

On average, less than 20 Contracting Parties

submitted reports annually.

62

The vast majority of

intervention reports were submitted by Paris Memorandum of
understanding member States, which is examined later in this
study.

The United States, Japan, Canada, and Australia also

regularly submit reports.

Very few reports were received

from developing States or open registry States.
Similarly, few flag States submit comments to the MSC
regarding the status of their outstanding deficiencies.

For

example, as of September 1991 there were 218 outstanding flag
66 Ibid.,

regulation 19(d).
IMO Resolution A.466(XII), p. 18.
62 "Flag State Compliance: Deficiency Reports."
MSC 60/11/1, at annex 5, dated 10 January
1992. An analysis of the 8393 deficiencies submitted to the MSC during the seven year period
revealed that 78.85 percent of them involved (1) life-saving equipment (34.97 percent), (2) fire
detection or extinguishing equipment (30.97 percent), and navigation safety (12.91 percent). A
large number of the deficiency reports involved ships registered under open registries.
61
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State deficiencies.

Developing States and open registry

States accounted for 79.35 percent of them, with Panama
having the largest number of outstanding deficiencies with 66
(or 30 percent).
The number of States submitting reports required by MARPOL
73/78 is also small.

Among other r epor-t.s ;" the Convention

requires Contracting Parties to submit an annual report
detailing: (1) the number of incidents involving oil spillage
of 100 tons or more, (2) reports by the Coastal state of
alleged violations referred to the flag State, (3) a summary
of actions taken with respect to alleged violations of the
Convention's discharge provisions referred to that State, (4)
a summary of alleged inadequacy of reception facilities as
well as actions taken, (5) the effectiveness of port State
control actions, (6) a summary of penalties imposed, and (7)
a summary of vessels delayed, detained or denied entry. 64

A

recent study conducted by the Friends of the Earth
International (FOEI), a nongovernmental environmental group,
found that only about 20 percent of the 70 parties to the
Convention submit annual reports.

65

For example, in mid-1990,

only 9 countries - Australia, Bulgaria, China, Germany,
Greece, Japan, Norway, the United Kingdom and the United
States - submitted reports. 66
Because few Contracting Parties submit reports required by
SOLAS or MARPOL, it is difficult to assess or analyze the
83 As

required by articles 4, 5 ,6 and 8.
MARPOL 73n8, supra note 7, article 11«1)(e) and (f).
65 "Study on operational discharges from ships." MEPC 32/14/1, dated 16 January 1992.
66 "Enforcement of Pollution Conventions: Violations of Conventions and Penalties Imposed."
MEPC 32/14, dated 13 November 1991.
64
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effectiveness these instruments have on maritime safety or
pollution prevention.

Moreover, for this reason, it is

difficult to judge whether (1) Contracting Parties are
fulfilling their responsibilities under the conventions, or
(2) port State control is having any effect on reducing the
numbers of substandard ships, or (3) the level of fines
levied under MARPOL are adequate in severity to reduce
pollution.
There are a number of reasons why Contracting Parties fail to
submit reports.

Some states may not report simply because

there have been no actions or violations while others lack
the appropriate mechanisms - resources, technical skills,
finances - to properly apply or enforce the relevant
conventions.

The IMO should take steps to strengthen its

reporting procedures.
3.2 REGIONAL PORT STATE CONTROL EFFORTS

3.2.1 PARIS MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING ON PORT STATE CONTROL
(PARIS MOUl

The Paris MOU coordinates the port State control programs of
the maritime authorities of 15 Western European nations.

67

More specifically, the agreement standardizes inspection,
detention, rectification, and reporting procedures and
facilitates the systematic exchange of information among its
members through its computer center - "Centre Administratif
des Affaires Maritimes" (CAAM) - located in Saint-Malo,
87 R\RIS MOU. 21 ILM 1. Entered into force January 1982. Members include Belgium ,
Denmark, Rnland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland . Note:
Poland adhered to the MOU on 27 November 1991.
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France.
The Paris MOU was adopted in January 1982 and came into
operation in July of that year, replacing the Hague
Memorandum. 68

The latter agreement was implemented by eight

North Sea States in March 1978 shortly after the AMOCO CADIZ
grounded off the coast of France to coordinate their port
State control efforts.

However, for various reasons, it

proved to be ineffective.

Consequently, in December 1980,

the ministers of thirteen European countries met in Paris to
examine ways of improving the effectiveness of control on
foreign ships in their ports.

The result was the Paris MOU.

3.2.2 ORGANIZATION

The organizational structure of the Paris MOU is as follows:
The Port State Control Committee.
executive body.

The Committee is the MOU's

It is composed of representatives from each

of the fifteen maritime authorities and the Commission of the
European Communities.

Representatives of the IMO and the ILO

participate as observers.

Among other things, the committee

reviews and approves matters relating to the operation and
effectiveness of the Memorandum, including surveyor
qualifications and training and inspection procedures.

It

meets annually.
The Secretariat.

The secretariat handles day to day

administrative matters, including the preparation of meetings
and reports and the exchange of information among member
68 M.

Titz, supra note 44, p. 191.
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Figure 3

Paris MOU boarding data 1989-1991
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nations.

It is located at the Netherlands' Ministry of

Transport and Public Works in Rijswijk, the Netherlands. 5 9
The Computer Center.

The CAAM is operated by the government

of France in Saint-Malo, France.

Because the results of all

port State inspections are entered into the center's
computers, the CAAM permits member States to retrieve
critical information, for example outstanding discrepancies,
prior to boarding a vessel.

Additionally, the center

provides valuable statistical data. 70

3.2.3 INSPECTIONS

Since 1982 MOU members have boarded nearly 78,000 vessels,
delaying or detaining 3,411 of them for non-compliance with
international standards. 71

Under the agreement each member

State must maintain an effective system of port State control
so as to enable it to annually inspect 25 percent of the
foreign-flag ships calling at its ports. 72

In theory, this

ensures that about 85 percent of all ships using the ports of
member states are boarded.

To date, however, MOU member

States have fallen short of this goal, attaining only a 23.7
percent inspection rate in 1991 (1990: 23.0 percent; 1989:
20.6 percent; 1988: 18.2 percent).

Historically, between 3.5

and 6 percent of the vessels boarded by member States are
detained annually.

In 1991, the detention rate was 5.25

percent (in 1990 4.48 percent, in 1989 3.75 percent).

69
70
71
72

F¥\RIS MOU, supra note 67, section 6.
Ibid.
Paris Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control, Annual Reports (1982 -1991).
F¥\RIS MOU, supra not 67, section 1.3
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The agreement's main goal is to ensure that vessels calling
at member ports comply with international standards relating
to safety of life at sea, pollution prevention, and on board
working and living conditions, as set forth in the following
instruments:
(1)

SOLAS 74/78;

(2)

LLC 66;

(3)

MARPOL 73/78;

(4)

STCW 78;

(5)

the Convention for the International Regulations
for preventing Collisions as Sea (COLREGS 72);

(6 )

ILO 147.

73

Paris MOU boarding procedures closely parallel IMO and ILO
port State control guidelines, as described earlier in this
chapter.

Where inspections uncover deficiencies that are

clearly hazardous to safety, health or the environment ships
are detained in port until such time as they are corrected. 74
To avoid duplicating inspections, ships that have been
inspected within the previous six months by any of the other
Authority may not be reinspected, unless they have clear
grounds for further inspection. 75
3.2. 4 OTHER REGIONAL EFFORTS

Based in part on the success of the Paris MOU, the IMO
Assembly adopted resolution A.683(XVII), Regional Cooperation in the Control of Ships and Discharges, in 17
73
74
75

Ibid., section 2.1.
Ibid., section 3.7.
Ibid., section 3.4.

43

November 1991.

The resolution invites governments to

consider participating in regional agreements and requests
the secretary-general to secure funds for the organization of
regional seminars on matters related to port State control.
Other regional port State control programs are presently
being considered.

For example, in February 1992,a group of

eight 7 6 Asia-Pacific nations met in Tokyo, Japan to consider
establishing a regional Asia-Pacific port State control
arrangement.
3 • 3 ANALYSIS

National port State control inspection programs vary greatly
in structure, capabilities, and inspection policies with
certain States, namely the United States, Japan, Australia,
Canada, and Paris MOU member States, having fairly
sophisticated, aggressive programs and other States,
primarily developing States, having relatively small,
ineffective inspection programs or no programs at all.

As a

result, the level of enforcement varies greatly from State to
State.

Because the port State control regime is relatively

new and the individual State inspection programs very in size
and ability, it is difficult to judge whether the regime has
reduced the numbers of substandard ships or improved
compliance with international safety and pollution
instruments.

Moreover, the failure of many States to submit

to the IMO the reports required by SOLAS and MARPOL precludes
any detailed analysis or definitive judgments with regard to
the regime's effectiveness.
78 They include: Australia, China. Honk Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Philippines. Singapore, and
S. Korea . "Implementation of Instruments and Related Matters." MSC 60/11/3, February 14,
1991 .
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Implementing a port State control program requires money,
resources, and technical expertise.

Many developing States

lack the financial or technical wherewithal or infrastructure
to establish and maintain such programs and, consequently,
can not do so.

Moreover, the IMO port State control

inspection guidelines and polices, as outlined in the
aforementioned IMO resolutions and documents, promote
inconsistent enforcement by port States because they are
nonbinding.

Consequently, port States may interpret and

apply IMO inspection standards differently, subjecting ship
owners and operators to a variety of policies and practices.
What can be done to enhance the port State control regime?
First, the data currently collected and distributed by IMO is
incomplete, untimely, and inhibits the effectiveness of the
various port State inspection programs.

An efficient data

collection and information sharing system would greatly
reduce inconsistency among the various port State programs
and provide port States with valuable intelligence as to the
identity and history of substandard ships thus enabling them
to concentrate their efforts and limited resources on those
ships.

Therefore, the IMO should implement an information

system that would ensure the timely collection, analysis, and
sharing of information from the various port State inspection
programs.

Second, the IMO should codify (i.e., international

treaty) its port State inspection policies and procedures so
that they would be binding on all port States.

Finally, IMO

and leading maritime States should intensify their efforts to
provide training programs, technical assistance, and

45

financial aid for poor regions or States with no
infrastructure or resources to inspect vessels.
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CHAPTER 4 PORT STATE CONTROL
OVER VESSEL-SOURCE POLLUTION
4.1 INTRODUCTION

For centuries, flag States have enjoyed exclusive
jurisdiction over their vessels on the high seas, with the
attendant power to prescribe and enforce pollution prevention
standards (i.e., design, construction, equipment, manning,
and discharge standards).77

More importantly, flag States

have enjoyed the virtually exclusive right to inspect their
ships and prosecute violations of international and national
pollution standards anywhere in the world, including
violations that occurred within the internal waters and
territorial sea of another State, although the flag State,
coastal State, and port State shared concurrent jurisdiction
in these waters.
Beginning in the 1960s, many coastal States began to question
the idea of exclusive flag State jurisdiction over pollution
control standards.

A number of high profile pollution

incidents, for example, the 1967 grounding of the Liberianregistered tanker TORREY CANYON, which spilled 120,000 tons
of heavy crude oil onto the British and French coastlines,
vividly demonstrated the inability of some flag States to
effectively apply or enforce pollution prevention standards. 7 8
Moreover, under prevailing international law, the coastal
Convention on the High Seas , supra note 14, article 6(1) .
R. M'Gonigle and M. Zacher, Pollution, Politics, and International Law (Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1979), p. 144.
77
78
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State lacked jurisdiction to investigate or prosecute
pollution incidents involving foreign-flag vessels beyond
their territorial sea.

Thus, only a flag State could

investigate and prosecute suspected discharge violations on
the high seas, even if they took place in waters just outside
the three mile territorial sea and threatened pollution
damage to a State's coastal environment.
Frustrated by the inability to protect their coastal
environment from vessel-source pollution, coastal States
began to demand the right to prescribe and enforce pollution
control standards aboard foreign-flag vessels operating
beyond their territorial seas.

As might be expected,

traditional maritime powers resisted any attempt by coastal
States to restrict or impede navigation on the high seas.
However, a continuing number of vessel related pollution
incidents, particularly involving vessels registered in flag
of convenience or open registry countries, demonstrated that
sole reliance on flag State jurisdiction would not in itself
reduce vessel-source pollution. 79

Moreover, international

pollution prevention regulations proved to be ineffective in
curbing pollution from ships. 80
In recent years coastal State jurisdiction has undergone two
dramatic changes.

First, a majority of coastal States have

extended the geographic limits of their jurisdiction by (1)
expanding the traditional three mile territorial sea to
twelve miles and (2) establishing a 200 mile wide EEZ.

79
80

Ibid., see, for example, pp. 14·38.
Ibid., Chapter 4.
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second, international law gave States certain new enforcement
powers over foreign-flag vessels operating within these
jurisdictional zones.

To appease fears that freedom of

navigation would be impeded if coastal States were given
unrestricted authority to stop and board vessels at sea, port
States were given the competence to investigate and prosecute
violations of international pollution control standards
occurring on the high seas and in the jurisdictional zones of
other States.

In return, coastal States were granted limited

competence to prescribe and enforce pollution prevention
requirements aboard foreign-flag vessels operating in their
jurisdiction.
This chapter will examine the evolution of the port State
control regime with respect to vessel-source pollution and
outline the rights and duties accorded the port State under
current international law - MARPOL 73/78.

Finally, it will

examine the rights and duties accorded the port State and the
coastal State and the concept of port State enforcement
outlined in the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea.
4.1.1 TRADITIONAL JURISDICTION

Under traditional international law, lithe sovereignty of a
State extends, beyond its land territory and its internal
waters, to a belt of sea adjacent to its coast described as
the territorial sea. ,,81

Article 17 of the 1958 Convention on

the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone empowers a
81 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, article 1. 516 UNTS 252. Entry
into force on 10 September 1964. Although the Convention did not establish the seaward limit of
the territorial sea, it was generally accepted by the majority of nations to be three miles from
land. T. Koh, 'The Origins of the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea," 29 Malaya Law
Review (1987), p. 6.
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coastal States to prescribe and enforce pollution control
standards aboard foreign-flag vessels operating within their
territorial sea, subject to the right of innocent passage, as
follows:
Foreign ships exerclslng the right of innocent passage
shall comply with the laws and regulations enacted by
the coastal State in conformity with these articles and
other rules of international law, and in particular,
with such laws and regulations relating to transport and
navigation.
Historically, coastal State jurisdiction over foreign-flag
shipping, with some exception, was limited to the seaward
limit of the territorial sea.

Beyond the territorial [the

high seas] the flag State enjoyed exclusive jurisdiction over
its vessels with at least two exceptions.

First, some

coastal States extended domestic pollution control laws to
their contiguous zones.

The Convention on the Territorial

Sea and Contiguous Zone created a contiguous zone extending
"twelve mile from the baseline from which the breadth of the
territorial sea is measured. 82

within this zone, lithe coastal

state may exercise the control necessary to: (a) Prevent
infringement to its customs, fiscal, immigration, or sanitary
regulations within its territory or territorial sea; (b)
Punish infringement of the above regulations committed within
its territory or territorial sea. ,,83

Although the term

sanitary was not defined, certain States interpreted the term
to include vessel-source pollution regulations.

84

Second, the

1969 International Convention Relating to Intervention on the
High Seas in Cases of oil Pollution, adopted after the TORREY
82
83
84

Ibid, article 24.
Ibid.
R. Legatski, supra note 1, p. 457.
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CANYON disaster, empowers the coastal State to undertake
whatever measures are necessary "to prevent grave and
imminent danger to its coastline or related interests from
oil pollution which is reasonably expected to have major
harmful

consequences."~

4. 1 .2 EXPANSION OF COASTAL STATE JURISDICTION

Beginning with the Truman Proclamation in the mid-1940s,
coastal states began extending the geographic limits of their
jurisdiction seaward, in some cases claiming up to 200 miles
from shore, to enable them to exercise control over the
living and nonliving resources (i.e., fishing, oil, gas, and
minerals) within these waters. 86

Later, some coastal States

made such claims to gain an increased measure of protection
against environmental harms resulting from vessel-source
pollution.

For example, in the late 1960s Canada claimed a

pollution control zone extending 100 miles seaward from the
Canadian coast north of the 60th parallel.

Within this zone

the government of Canada claimed the right to regulate the
discharge of pollutants from ships as well as vessel design
requirements and equipment standards. 87
Today, a majority of States claim twelve mile wide
territorial seas and 200 wide EEZ. 88

Within these new

jurisdictional zones, the MARPOL 73/78 and the 1982 UN
Convention on the Law of the Sea bestow specific standard
setting and enforcement authority with respect to vessel45 9
88
87
88

ILM 25. Entered into force on 6 May 1975.
R. Legatski, supra note 1, p. 457.
Ibid., p. 458.
Ibid., p. 457.
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source pollution to the coastal State and the port State.
These new powers range from broad rights in ports and
internal waters to limited rights in EEZs and high seas.

The

following sections will examine these new rights and duties.

4.2 DEVELOPMENT OF THE PORT STATE CONTROL REGIME

4.2.1 THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE PREVENTION OF
POLLUTION OF SEA BY OIL (OILPOL 54/69 )89

The first international convention dealing with the control
of pollution from ships was the OILPOL 54/69. 9 0

Under the

convention, vessels were prohibited from discharging oil with
an oil content of more than 100 ppm into waters within 50
miles of land.

Beyond that distance vessels were free to

discharge oil without restriction.

The Convention lacked any

requirements for mechanical monitoring of discharges, namely
because suitable technology did not yet exist.

consequently,

crews were forced to verify whether discharges exceeded the
100 ppm standard by visual inspection.

A 1962 IMO amendment

adopted stricter discharge standards (ships of over 20,000
gross tons, built after a specified date, were prohibited
from discharging oil anywhere at sea, except for safety
reasons) and increased the coastal prohibition zone to 100
mi.Las ;"

The IMO amended the convention again in 1969.

The

amendment formally adopted the load-on-top system (LOT) and
prescribed new discharge limits (60 liters per mile to a

89 OILPOL 54/69. Entered into force on 26 July 1958, 327 UNTS 3; as amended in 1962,600
UNTS 332, and 1969, 600 UNTS 336.
90 An attempt was made in 1926 to enact an international treaty dealing with marine
prevention ; however, it never entered into force.
91 D. Abecassis, supra note 45, p. 26.
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maximum of 1/15,000 of the ship's cargo-carrying capacity.92
The convention contained the traditional prescriptive and
enforcement authority, granting the flag State exclusive
authority to prescribe standards and investigate and
prosecute alleged discharge violations on the high seas.
Coastal states were prohibited from investigating or
prosecuting unlawful discharges occurring outside the seaward
limits of the territorial sea (at the time generally three
miles).

within the territorial sea and internal waters their

inspection was limited to the examination of the oil record
book.

The convention required all vessels to maintain an oil

record book and to log the transfer or discharge of oil,
including illegal discharges. 93

Under Article IX (2) of the

convention, a properly certified log entry was "admissible in
any judicial proceedings as evidence of the facts stated in
the entry."

Needless to say, ship officers were not likely

to incriminate themselves by logging illegal discharges.
Coastal States and port States were obligated to forward any
alleged violation of the Convention's discharge standards to
a vessel's flag State for prosecution. 94

Upon receiving such

information, flag States were obligated to conduct an
investigation and to initiate proceedings if the
investigation provided evidence of

guilt.~

Finally, flag

States were obligated to forward to the IMO and reporting
states information regarding the results of any judicial
proceedanqs ;"
92 Ibid.,
93
94
95
96

pp. 27-29.
OILPOL 54/69, supra note 89, article IX.
Ibid., article X(2).
Ibid.
Ibid.
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The Convention provided no explicit prescriptive or
enforcement authority to ports States.

However, article XI,

recognized the traditional rights of coastal states and port
states to prescribe and enforce standards within their
jurisdiction (i.e., territorial seas and internal waters).
Thus, coastal States and port States could implement more
stringent legislation within their ports and, subject to the
right of innocent passage, territorial waters.
Compliance with OILPOL 54/69 can be characterized as dismal
for two reasons: (1) the dearth of suitable compliance
mechanisms, and (2) the failure of most flag States to
enforce the Convention's requirements. 97

The lack of suitable

mechanical detection equipment and heavy reliance on the oil
record book generally precluded any hope of either detecting
or prosecuting a discharge violation outside of port.
Coastal State enforcement efforts proved to be ineffective,
as few states had the necessary resources to conduct adequate
surveillance activities within their territorial sea.
Moreover, determining the oil content of an effluent was
nearly impossible on the open ocean ,"

Consequently, the vast

majority of violations where detected in ports or inland
waters.

However, many flag States failed to prosecute

alleged violations forwarded from other states, and, even if
they did, few reported the results of their proceedings to
IMO or the initiating state, as required by the Convention.

97

R. M'Gonigle and M. Zacher supra note 78, pp. 291-223.

98

Ibid., p. 220.

54

with minor exception, attempts by various nations to enhance
the Conventions enforcement provisions failed.

For example,

British and French delegates to a 1962 conference proposed
that states be given the right of in-port inspection.

The

British proposal limited boardings to only those vessels
where incriminating information had been received, while the
French proposal demanded the right to board any vessel.

Both

proposals were soundly defeated by on the grounds that they
interfered with the autonomy of individual states.

At the

1969 conference the British proposal fared somewhat better,
being adopted as a nonbinding IMO Assembly resolution. 99
4.2.2 MARPOL 73/78

In 1973, the International Conference on Marine Pollution
convened in London under the auspices of the IMO to draft a
new convention to replace the OILPOL 54/69.

In November of

1973, the Conference adopted the International Convention for
the Prevention of Pollution from Ships.

In 1978, the

International Conference on Tanker safety and Pollution
Prevention amended the Convention (the 1978 Protocol).

The

Convention mandates extensive vessel design, construction,
equipment, and discharge standards for the following
substances :100
Annex I
Annex II
Annex III
Annex IV
Annex V

Oil
Noxious Liquid Substances
Harmful Substances in Packaged
Forms, Freight Containers, Portable
Tanks or Road and Rail Tank Wagons.
Sewage
Garbage

Ibid., p. 224
For additional information on MARPOL 73/78 see S. Pullen, "The Environmental Challenge
- Marine Pollution and MARPOL Convention, Ports and Harbors, November 1991, pp. 22-26.
gg

100
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In addition, MARPOL 73/78 granted port States for the first
time the explicit right to board, detain, and, if necessary,
penalize foreign-flag vessels operating in their ports,
internal waters, and at offshore terminals for violations of
the Convention's standards.

In a striking departure from

customary international law, the Convention also empowered
the port State to investigate (but not prosecute) a
contravention of its discharge standards committed by
foreign-flag vessels navigating on the high seas and in the
jurisdictional zones of another State.

The following

discussion provides a summary of the powers granted to the
port State under the MARPOL 73/78.
Under the Convention, the port State may inspect a foreignflag vessel in a port or at an off-shore terminal to
determine compliance with the Convention's design,
construction, and equipment standards. 101

The inspection,

however, is limited to verifying whether a vessel has a valid
International Oil Pollution Prevention Certificate (IOPP) and
other applicable documents.

[Note: Among other things, the

Convention requires the flag State to (1) periodically
inspect its vessels, and (2) issue IOPP certificate, which
certifies that a vessel is in compliance with Convention
standards.]

If there are "clear grounds" for believing that

the condition of the ship or its equipment does not
correspond substantially with the particulars of the
certificate or the ship does not have a valid certificate,

10\

MAR POL 73f78. supra note 7, article 5(2) .
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the port State may physically inspect the ves se L?"

If the

ship is found unfit, the port State is then obligated to
prevent it from sailing "until it can proceed to sea without
presenting an unreasonable threat of harm to the marine
environment. ,,103

However, the ship may be allowed to leave

port or an off-shore terminal to sail to the nearest shipyard
for repair .104
Additionally, a port State may deny a foreign ship entry into
a port or off-shore terminal if it is found to be in
violation of the Convention's standards.

If a port State

denies a vessel entry into a port or offshore terminal or
finds that it does not carry a valid certificate, or takes
action against the ship for noncompliance with the
conventions design, construction, or equipment standards, it
must notify the applicable representative of the flag State .105
Additionally, the port State is obligated to require ships of
non-party States to comply with the Convention s standards .106
I

The Convention also empowers the port State to board a
foreign-flag vessel in a port or at an offshore terminal to
investigate a contravention of the Conventions discharge
standards .107

In a dramatic departure from traditional

international law, the Convention grants the port State the
authority to board a foreign-flag vessel in a port or at an
offshore terminal for the purpose of conducting an
Ibid.
Ibid.
104 Ibid.
105 Ibid., article 5(3).
'06 Ibid., article 5(4).
'07 Ibid., article 6

102

103
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investigation of an alleged unlawful discharge occurring in
its EEZ or on the high seas. 108

This was a major victory for

coastal States and port States.

previously, under customary

international law, their jurisdiction was, with certain
exceptions, limited to their internal waters and territorial
sea.

However, they did not achieve a complete victory.

Under the convention, the flag State retained the exclusive
right to prosecute violations occurring in the EEZ and on the
high seas.

The Convention requires the coastal State and the

port State to forward their investigations to the flag State
for prosecution in such

cases.l~

In addition, the port State was granted the right to
investigate a contravention of the Conventions discharge
standards occurring in the jurisdictional zones of another
state if so requested by that state .110

Any such request,

however, must be accompanied with sufficient evidence that
the ship has committed an unlawful discharge.

The port State

is obligated to forward a report of its investigation to the
party requesting it and to the vessel's flag State.
MARPOL 73/78 gave the port State the explicit right to
prosecute foreign-flag vessels voluntarily within a port or
at an offshore terminal for violations of the Convention's
design, construction, equipment, and discharge standards. l l l
with the exceptions noted above, a port State may upon
discovering a violation either initiate proceedings under its
loa
109
110
lIt

Ibid., article 6(2).
Ibid .
Ibid., article 6(5).
Ibid., article 4.
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own laws or furnish the information and evidence to the flag
State for prosecution. ll2

Upon receiving such information, the

flag state must initiate an investigation and, upon
competition of that investigation, inform the port State and
the IMO of the action taken. l13

Finally, the flag State can,

at any time, assume jurisdiction over a case involving one of
its vessels.

Upon request, the port State must forward any

evidence collected during its investigation to the flag State
and is then prohibited from further action.
Although the Convention accorded States the right to
investigate discharge violations occurring outside their
territorial sea, the flag State retained the exclusive right
to prosecute such violations occurring in the EEZ and on the
high seas.

Many coastal States concerned about the

reluctance of some flag States to investigate or prosecute
violations aboard their ships were not satisfied with this
arrangement.

Instead, they wanted the right to prosecute

foreign-flag vessels for violations occurring outside their
territorial sea, even if that meant stopping and boarding
vessels at sea.

On the other hand, maritime states sought to

preserve traditional high seas navigational freedoms.

During

the 1973 conference, the concept of port State enforcement
was introduced as a compromise between these divergent
interests. 114

Under this concept, the port state could

prosecute any vessel voluntarily in a port for violations of
the Convention's discharge standards committed in the EEZ and
on the high seas.
112
113
114

The proposal was an attractive alternative

Ibid., article 4(2).
Ibid., article 4(3).
R. M'Gonigle and M. Zacher, supra note 78. p. 231.
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to extending the jurisdiction of the coastal State beyond the
territorial sea, possibly as far as 200 miles.

However, it

was defeated, in part, due to concerns by some maritime
states that it would increase costs and lead to delays in
port. ll5

Its defeat meant that the flag State retained

exclusive authority to prosecute its vessels for violations
occurring outside the territorial sea.
4.2.3 THE 1982 UN CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA

The 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea gave the port
State and the coastal State broad new prescriptive and
enforcement powers with respect to the regulation of
pollution from ships.

The major enforcement innovation of

the Convention was the adoption of the concept of port State
en torcement.v'"

This concept, essentially the same one

rejected at the 1973 International Conference on Marine
Pollution, empowered the port State to investigate and
prosecute foreign-flag vessels for violations of
international discharge standards committed on the high seas
or in the jurisdictional zones of another state.
The debate between the right of the coastal State to protect
its shores and adjacent waters from pollution and freedom of
navigation became a key issue at the Law of the Sea
Conference.

As they did during the 1973 International

Conference on Marine Pollution, coastal States demanded
increased enforcement powers, particularly within the newly
created EEZ.

115
1\8

However, the threat that this posed to freedom

Ibid
I ., p. 232 .
Ibid., p. 249.

60

of navigation made this enforcement alternative unacceptable
to many maritime powers. 117

In a compromise, the Convention

granted the coastal State certain limited enforcement powers,
while it bestowed significant new enforcement authority on
the port State. 118

The convention empowered the port State

with the authority to board foreign-flag vessels within its
ports or at an off-shore to investigate and, if necessary,
prosecute violations of international pollution discharge
standards occurring on the high seas or in the jurisdictional
zones of another state.

This was seen as a far more

attractive and safer alternative to stopping and boarding
ships at sea.
The following discussion provides a summary of the
prescriptive and enforcement powers accorded the port State
and the coastal State under the convent.Lonv'"

It should be

noted that the 1982 Convention on the Law of Sea is not yet
in force and, therefore, it is not yet binding, except for
those provisions recognized as being declaratory.
4.2.4 PRESCRIPTIVE AUTHORITY

Under the Convention, the port State retained its traditional
rights to prescribe national standards within its internal

117 A. Boyle, "Marine Pollution Under the Law of the Sea Convention," 79 American Journal of
International Law (1985), p. 364.
118 Ibid.
118 Also see J. Bernhardt. "A Schematic Analysis of Vessel-Source Pollution : Prescriptive and
Enforcement Regimes in the Law of the Sea Conference." 20 Virginia Journal of Law 265-311
(1980); A. Boyle. "Marine Pollution Under the Law of the Sea Convention." 79 American Journal
of International Law 347-372 (1985); S. Meese. "When Jurisdictional Interests Collide:
International, Domestic, and State Efforts to Prevent Vessel Source Oil Pollution." 12 Ocean
Development and International Law Journal 71-139 (1982); M. Drel'. "Enforcement measures
against pollution of the sea." 12 Marine Policy 297-305 (1988); I. Booth. "Intemational ship
pollution law." 4 Marine Policy 215-228(1980).
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waters .120

It must notify foreign-flag vessels and the

"competent international or qan.Laat.Lon"'" of its
requirements. 1 22
In the territorial sea, the coastal State may prescribe
national rules and regulations for discharge standards which
exceed international standards. 123

It may also prescribe

construction, design, and equipment standards. 124

However, the

Convention prohibits the coastal State from enacting
standards that exceed "generally accepted international rules
or s candards ;"?"

Thus, the coastal State cannot enforce more

stringent national standards, a stipulation placed in the
Convention to preserve the right of innocent passage.
In the EEZ, the coastal State may prescribe "laws and
regulations for the prevention, reduction, and control of
pollution from vessels conforming to and giving effect to
generally accepted international rules and standards
established through the competent international organization
or general diplomatic conference.,,126

The coastal State may

not prescribe discharge standards or construction, design,
and equipment standards that exceed "generally accepted
international rules or st.andards ; « : "

UN Document AlCONF. 62/121, supra note 9, article 25(2), 211(3).
Although not specifically stated, IMO is the generally recognized as the competent
international organization referred to in the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.
122 UN Document A/CONF. 62/121, supra note 9, article 211(3).
123 Ibid., article 211(4); also see A. Boyle, supra note 117, pp. 359-360; S. Meese, supra note
119, p.90.
124 UN Document A/CONF. 62/121, supra note 9, artide 21(2).
125 Ibid., articles 21(2) and 211(4).
126 Ibid., article 211(5).
127 J. Bernhardt, supra note 119, pp.278-280; S. Meese, supra note 119, p. 90.
120

121
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4.2.5 ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY

The Convention bestowed upon the port State and the coastal
State broad new powers with respect to the enforcement of
national and international vessel-source pollution
standards.

l28

Under the Convention, the port State retained

the power to investigate, detain, and prosecute foreign-flag
vessels in its internal waters for violations of national and
international pollution laws.

Additionally, when a foreign-

flag vessel is voluntarily within a port or at an offshore
terminal, a State may institute proceedings in respect of any
violation of national or international laws committed within
its territorial sea or EEZ. l29
In the territorial sea, the coastal State may physically
inspect a foreign-flag vessel navigating within that zone
when there are clear grounds for believing that it committed
a violation of a national or international pollution law or
standard.

Where the evidence indicates that a violation

occurred, it may detain the vessel and institute
proceedf.nqs v'"

Coastal State powers are more limited in the EEZ.

Their

authority to board, detain, or prosecute a foreign-flag
vessel suspected of violating a national or international
pollution law in the EEZ is keyed to the degree of
environmental harm resulting from such a violation. 131

UN Document A/CONF. 62/121, supra note 9, article 220 (1-8).
Ibid., article 220 (1).
130 Ibid., article 220(2).
131 A. Boyle, supra note 117, p. 364.

128

129
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When there are clear grounds for believing that a vessel
violated a national or international pollution law in the
EEZ, the coastal State may require it lito give information
regarding its identity and port of registry, its last and its
next port of call and other relevant information required to
establish whether a violation occuzred ;"?"

The coastal State

may not physically inspect the vessel unless the following
two conditions are present.

First, there must be clear

grounds to believe that it committed a violation that
resulted in a substantial discharge, causing or threatening
significant pollution of the marine environment.

Second, the

vessel has failed to provide information regarding its
identity and port of registry, its last and its next port of
call and other relevant information required to establish
whether a violation has occurred. U3

The coastal State may

only detain and prosecute a vessel when a violation resulted
in a discharge causing major damage or threat of major damage
to the coastline or related interests of the and coastal
State, or to any resources of it territorial sea or EEZ .134
The coastal State may board a vessel suspected of committing
a violation in the EEZ while the vessel is navigating in
either its EEZ or territorial sea.
Finally, States may upon their own initiative or at the
request of any party detain a foreign-flag vessel within one
of their ports or off-shore terminals for violations of
international standards relating to seaworthiness if that

132 UN
133
134

Document A/CONE 62/121, supra note 9, article 220(3)
Ibid., article 220(5).
Ibid., article 220(6).
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violation threatens damage to the marine environment. 135

4 .2. 6 PORT STATE ENFORCEMENT 36

As noted above, the concept of port State enforcement
empowers the port State to investigate and prosecute a
foreign-flag ship voluntarily within its port or at an
offshore terminal for violations of international discharge
standards occurring on the high seas or in the jurisdictional
zones of another state.

Article 218 of the Convention

provides:
Enforcement by port States

1. When a vessel is voluntarily within a port or at
an off-shore terminal of a State, that State may
undertake investigations and, where the evidence so
warrants, institute proceedings in respect of any
discharge from that vessel outside the internal
waters, territorial sea or exclusive economic zone
of that State in violation of applicable international
rules and standards established through the competent
international organization or general diplomatic
conference.
2. No proceedings pursuant to paragraph 1 shall be
instituted in respect of a discharge violation in
the internal waters, territorial sea or exclusive
economic zone of another State unless requested by
that State, the flag State, or a State damaged or
threatened ,by the discharge violation, or unless the
violation has caused or is likely to cause pollution
in the internal waters, territorial sea or exclusive
economic zone of the State instituting the
proceedings.
3. When a vessel is voluntarily within a port or
at an off-shore terminal of a State, that State
shall, as far a practicable, comply with requests
from any State for investigation of a discharge
violation referred to in paragraph 1, believed to
Ibid., article 219.
Detailed proposals on port State enforcement made at the UN Law of the Co~ference
can be found in: the Informal Negotiating Text, UN Doc. A/CONF.621WP.8/P~rt III, Art!c1es 27-40;
the Revised Single Negotiating Text, UN Doc. A1CONF.621WP.8/REV.1/PAR r ~II, Articles 28 TO
30; the Informal Composite Negotiating Text, UN Doc. A/CONF. 62NJP.10, Articles 219 and 220.
135
136
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have occurred in, caused, or threatened damage to
the internal waters, territorial sea or exclusive
economic zone of the requesting State. It shall
likewise, as far as practicable, comply with
requests from the flag State for investigation of
such a violation, irrespective of where the
violation occurred.
4. The records of the investigation carried out
by a port State pursuant to this article shall be
transmitted upon request to the flag State or to
the coastal State. Any proceedings instituted by
the port State on the basis of such an investigation
may, subject to section 7, be suspended at the
request of the coastal State when the violation
has occurred within its internal waters, territorial
sea or exclusive economic zone. The evidence and
records of the case, together with any bond or other
financial security posted with the authorities of
the port State, shall in that event be transmitted to
the coastal State. Such transmittal shall preclude
the continuation of proceedings in the port State.
Under Article 218, port State enforcement competence is
limited to the investigation and prosecution of foreign-flag
vessels suspected of discharging pollutants (in violation of
international discharge standards) on the high seas or in the
internal waters, territorial sea, or EEZ of another state.
This includes accidental or operational discharges of oil,
noxious and hazardous substances in bulk or packaged form,
sewage, and garbage.

A port State may not initiate

enforcement action against a foreign-flag vessel (under this
article) for a violation of international design, equipment,
or manning standards when the violation occurred on the high
seas, although it may do so under other articles of the
Convention if such a violation is discovered while a vessel
is within its own or another states internal waters,
territorial sea, or EEZ.

Under this article, a port State

may only initiate enforcement action against a foreign-flag
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vessel when it is voluntarily within one of its ports or at
an off-shore terminal.

Thus, a port State cannot compel a

vessel on the high seas to proceed to one of its ports.
If a violation has occurred within the internal waters,
territorial sea or EEZ of another State, the port State may
investigate and, if appropriate, institute proceedings only
if requested to do so by the coastal State, flag State, or
other State damaged by the discharge. 137

The port State,

however, is not obligated to comply with the request and may
in fact decline to take action. 138

Lastly, a coastal State may

preempt a port State's investigation or proceeding should it
choose to pursue a case in its own courts. 139
4.2.7 Safeguards

In order to preclude possible abuses by port States (and
Coastal States) the Convention provides a number of
safeguards .140

The following paragraph summarizes the

Convention's significant safeguards:
• ports States must facilitate the hearing of
witnesses and the collection and admission of
evidence; 141
• enforcement may only be conducted by duly
authorized officials and clearly marked government
vessels or aircraft; 142

138

UN document A/CONF. 62/121, supra note 9, article 218(2).
M. Drel', "Enforcement measures against pollution of the sea," 12 Marine Policy (1988), p.

139

UN Document AlCONF. 62/121, supra note 9, article 218(4); J. Bernhardt, supra note 119,

137

304.
p.287.
140
141
142

Ibid., articles 223-233.
Ibid., article 223.
Ibid., article 224.
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• enforcement activities shall not endanger the
safety of navigation, create a hazard, or place
a vessel in an unsafe port or anchorage or expose
the marine environment to r Lskj ' ?
•

states shall not unduly delay a foreign-flag
vessel; 144

• physical inspections shall be limited to an
examination of certificates and other required
documents unless there are clear grounds for
believing that the condition of the vessel or its
equipment does not substantially correspond with the
certificates; the contents of such documents are
not sufficient to confirm or verify a suspected
violation; or the vessel is not carrying valid
certificates and records;
145

•

ships must be released upon posting the proper
bond or other appropriate financial security, unless
its release would present an unreasonable threat of
damage to the marine environment;146

•

states shall not discriminate against vessels of
any other state ;147

• port State legal action must be suspended "upon the
taking of proceedings to impose penalties in respect
of corresponding charges by the flag State within
six months of the date on which proceedings were
first instituted, except (1) when those proceedings
relate to a case of major damage, and (2) the flag
State has repeatedly disregarded its obligation to
enforce effectively the applicable international
rules and standards; 148
• only monetary penalties may be imposed for
violations; 149
143 Ibid.,

article 225.
Ibid., article 226 (1)(a).
145 Ibid.
146 Ibid., article 226 (b)
147 Ibid" article 227.
148 Ibid., article 228.
14Q Ibid., article 230.
144
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•

states are liable for damage or loss if their
enforcement measures are unlawful or unreasonable. 150

4.3 ANALYSIS

Prior to the 1970s, the regime for enforcing international
pollution prevention standards was largely ineffective due,
in part, to the exclusive reliance on flag State enforcement.
Since the 1970s, however, a number of international treaties
have reinforced and strengthened the enforcement regime by
(1) strengthening flag State obligations and (2) expanding
port State and coastal State competence over foreign-flag
vessels with respect to vessel-source pollution.
The most innovative change has been the development of the
port State enforcement regime under the 1982 UN Convention on
the Law of the Sea.

This concept departs radically from the

traditional doctrine of international law that gave the flag
State exclusive jurisdiction to prosecute its ships for
offenses committed on the high seas.

The proposed regime,

however, poses a number of significant challenges to its
effective implementation.

First, it remains to be seen

whether port states will be willing to investigate and
prosecute violations occurring beyond the limits of their
sovereignty, particularly when they pose no threat to their
waters.

Moreover, some port States may be unwilling to press

charges for such violations for fear of economic losses.

A

port State with a reputation for aggressively prosecuting
foreign vessels may find that fewer vessels are willing to
call at its ports, causing loss of revenues.
150

Ibid., article 232.
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Second, the

detection, investigation, and prosecution of discharge
violations requires a significant expenditure of time,
effort, and money.

To fulfill their responsibilities port

States will need an administrative infrastructure, trained
personnel, and equipment such airplanes and ships.

with the

exception of certain developed States, few port States have
the ability to implement such programs.

Who will provide

financial aid and training to countries that cannot afford to
implement port State enforcement programs?

Finally, the new

regime could also subject shipowners and crews to to a
multitude of jurisdictions exercised by port States having
different cultures and judicial systems.
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CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSIONS

In the past twenty years, port State enforcement competence
has undergone a dramatic expansion, as evidenced in a number
of international agreements, national laws, and port State
practices.

The port State enforcement regime provides an

effective, practical means of ensuring that all vessels
comply with international safety and pollution prevention
standards.

It is, however, too early to judge whether the

new regime has improved compliance with these standards or
reduced the number of substandard ships.

It is still in an

embryonic stage and there is a large variance in the
aggressiveness and capability of the various national port
State inspection programs.

Moreover, the failure of the

majority of Contracting Parties to submit reports to the IMO,
as required by SOLAS and MARPOL, precludes a comprehensive
analysis of the regime's effectiveness.

Nevertheless, the

port State enforcement regime has played (and will continue
to play) an increasingly important role in improving safety
of life at sea and reducing vessel-source pollution.
National port State control programs appear to operate
independently with little interaction or coordination, with
the exception of Paris MOU member states.

This has promoted

inconsistency among the various programs and diminished the
overall effectiveness of the port State regime.

Moreover, it

subjects shipowners and crews to a multitude of jurisdictions
exercised by port States having different cultures, policies,
71

and judicial systems.

The IMO has only recently begun to

harmonize the efforts of individual state programs most
notably by encouraging regional port State control programs.
However, the organization must do more to coordinate and
standardize the various State programs, particularly at the
international level.

First, it must enhance its ability to

collect, analyze, and disseminate information on substandard
ships.

The sharing of such information among port States

would allow them to focus their efforts and resources on
these ships.

Second, the use of nonbinding resolutions to

promulgate inspection policies promotes inconsistency among
the various port State programs.

The organization should

develop inspection policies that are binding on all nations.
Finally, developing states will need greater financial help,
training, and technical assistance to enable them to
implement effective port State enforcement program.

Although

the IMO presently provides this assistance, its efforts have
been hampered by funding problems.

Developed states will

need to provide greater funding to ensure that these
assistance programs continue to be available.
The enhancement of the port State jurisdiction regime does
not completely address the more critical concern that of the
failure certain flag States to exercise control over their
vessels.

The question of how to raise the standards of flag

States is outside the scope of this paper, but it is plain
that raising the level of compliance is only part of the
problem.

The other, more important part, lies in improving

the standard of the management of shipping companies and the
quality and conscientiousness of those involved with the sea.
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